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Technical Guidelines for United States—Mexico Coordination 
on Public Health Events of Mutual Interest 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In 2002, within the framework of the United States—Mexico  Binational Commission, 
representatives from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Mexico’s 
Secretaria de Salud established a binational group on Epidemiologic Surveillance and 
Information Exchange to address issues of interest to both countries.  With the objective 
of better defining how the two countries should collaborate on epidemiologic events of 
mutual interest, the present document has been elaborated by federal and state public 
health officials from both countries to provide a set of shared guidelines.     
 
The United States and Mexico have a rich tradition of collaboration on epidemiologic 
events involving the two countries, including infectious disease outbreaks, diseases 
associated with products from the other country, and the continuity of care for patients 
with tuberculosis and other key diseases, traveling between the two countries.  A joint 
Border Infectious Disease Surveillance project has been in place since 1999, and an Early 
Warning Infectious Disease Program was initiated in 2004.  In addition, the TB Cross-
border Management and Referral Project facilitates healthcare provider access to 
information on TB patients traveling between the two countries to ensure continuity of 
therapy.  The Laboratory Response Network, providing diagnostic support for select 
pathogens, includes public health laboratories from both Mexico and the United States as 
members.  Facilitated by the close ties resulting from these and other collaborations, 
public health professionals from the two countries have regularly sought to keep their 
counterparts apprised of relevant epidemiologic events.   
 
However, clear guidelines have not yet been formally adopted for what information 
should be shared and how the sharing should take place.  Public health officials from the 
two countries chose to formulate such a set of guidelines with the objectives of better 
institutionalizing the exchange of information on epidemiologic events of mutual interest, 
and promoting collaborative responses when appropriate.   
 
Recognizing that productive collaboration already occurs between many ‘sister cities’ 
along the United States—Mexico border and between neighboring states, it should be 
emphasized that the present Technical Guidelines for United States—Mexico 
Coordination on Public Health Events of Mutual Interest (Guidelines) should facilitate 
the continuation of existing binational cooperation, while at the same time fostering more 
systematic and comprehensive sharing of information at all levels of government.  These 
Guidelines focus primarily on coordination between the public health agencies/units that 
have primary responsibility for epidemiologic surveillance.  They do not seek to define 
coordination between agencies/units with major regulatory functions, for which 
arrangements have already been established.  
 
These Guidelines are being formally adopted following the entry into force in 2007 of the 
International Health Regulations (IHR). The IHR 
(http://www.who.int/ihr/9789241596664/en/index.html) provide a legally binding global 
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framework for the detection of, and response to, Public Health Emergencies of 
International Concern (PHEIC) requiring member nations to notify the World Health 
Organization (WHO) of any potential PHEIC.   
 
Given the very specific definition of what represents a PHEIC, the present Guidelines 
cover a broader scope of Public Health events than the IHR, addressing all Public Health 
events of interest to both the United States and Mexico, not being limited to public health 
emergencies.  In addition they are based on bilateral coordination to address the Public 
Health event of interest, without a requirement to involve WHO or the Pan-American 
Health Organization.  However, for any such event involving the two countries and that 
constitutes a PHEIC, the terms of the IHR prevail. In addition, Public Health events 
qualifying as a PHEIC such as the 2009-10 influenza pH1N1 pandemic illustrate how 
binational cooperation prior to and during the PHEIC can contribute to global response.    
 
The Guidelines are further consistent with and supportive of the IHR by representing a 
response to several of its articles regarding interactions between nations.   
 Article 21 – Ground Crossings – “States Parties sharing common borders should 
consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements 
concerning prevention or control of international transmission of disease at 
ground crossings in accordance with Article 57” 
 Article 44 – Collaboration and Assistance – which encourages State Parties to 
collaborate on “the detection and assessment of, and response to, events”, “the 
provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support, 
particularly in the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public 
health capacities”, “the mobilization of financial resources to facilitate 
implementation of their obligations” and “the formulation of proposed laws and 
other legal and administrative provisions for the implementation of these 
Regulations” 
 Article 57 – Relationship with other International Agreements – which asserts that 
States Parties “having certain interests in common owing to their health, 
geographical, social or economic conditions,” may develop “special treaties or 
arrangements in order to facilitate the application of IHR,” in particular “the 
direct and rapid exchange of public health information between neighboring 
territories of different States”, and the application of health measures at common 
frontiers. 
 
These Guidelines regard binational public health events as those affecting individuals or 
populations who translocate between the two countries. This concept recognizes that the 
rich and complex migration dynamics between the two countries extends beyond the 
United States-Mexico border area – currently considered 100 km (62 miles) at each side 
of the borderline, into the territories of Mexico and the U.S – and determines the risk of 
propagation of infectious diseases and other public health threats. 
 
This document has adopted the term binational case for referring to a confirmed or 
probable case of disease or other health event in an individual: 
 
 who has recently traveled or lived in the neighboring country, or had recent 
contact with persons who lived or traveled in the neighboring country; or  
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 who is thought to have acquired the disease in the neighboring country or 
have been in the neighboring country during the incubation period of an 
infection and was possibly contagious during this period; or 
 who is thought to have acquired the disease from a product or other exposure 
in the other country; or 
 whose case requires the collaboration of both countries for the purposes of 
disease investigation and control, regardless of the presumed site of infection 
or exposure 
 
These Guidelines are meant to provide guidance for public health agencies or institutions 
and their staff in responding to public health events of shared interest to both countries.  
While the Guidelines are not binding, it is planned they will lead to the development of 
shared protocols to facilitate their full implementation.   
 
 
2. General Principles 
 
The guidelines of this document are based on the following principles: 
 
2.1.  The Need to Share Information 
The primary mission of public health agencies or institutions of the United States and 
Mexico is to protect and promote the health of their citizens.  Public health events 
involving both countries – by geographic proximity, by translocation of their citizens, by 
exchange of their products, or by concurrent presentation of events – require the sharing 
of information between counterpart institutions.  Such sharing has the objectives of 
providing information about potential risks and facilitating an appropriate response for 
the protection of the health of the public, in whichever country they reside.  Adequate 
preparation for the risks of bioterrorism or other public health emergencies further 
requires that well-functioning, clearly defined channels of communication be established 
prior to the occurrence of such an event, to facilitate effective sharing of crucial 
information, and articulation of coordinated responses to ensure the greatest protection 
possible of the public’s health.   
 
In addition to sharing information to directly protect the public’s health, counterpart 
agencies are also expected to share information on other public health matters affecting 
both countries, such as revised policies, advisories or alerts on travel or imported 
products from the other country.  Such alterations in one country’s positions create 
important demands on the public health agency of the other country, for which they 
should be as well prepared as possible to respond.   
 
2.2.  Timely Sharing of Information 
The value of epidemiologic information is closely linked to its timeliness.  When needed, 
the sharing of such information between the United States and Mexico should occur in a 
time frame which allows the other country to respond to the specific health need in as 
timely a manner as possible, maximizing the potential for effective public health action to 
prevent avoidable disease, disability and mortality.  As such, information shared may be 
preliminary in nature and subject to change as events evolve.  Preliminary information 




2.3.  Quality of Information  
The value of the epidemiologic information being shared depends on its accuracy and 
completeness.  The national and state public health authorities of both countries need to 
commit to providing the most comprehensive and current epidemiologic information 
available. 
 
2.4.  Communication Pathways  
Clearly defined pathways between public health agencies or institutions of the United 
States and Mexico for communication of such epidemiologic information should be 
established to ensure rapid delivery to the appropriate agency and a high potential for 
action based on the information. 
 
Information exchange between the two countries should be reciprocal and favor 
symmetry in the participation of different levels of government of the two countries. 
When a specific need for binational information exchange arises, public health agencies 
at the local, state or federal levels of one country should communicate with their 
counterpart agency of the same level in the other country (i.e., local–local, state–state, or 
federal–federal). This should be conducted in parallel with communication to federal 
partners, as defined by national policies. Federal public health agencies or institutions or 
officials who intervene, participate, facilitate, or promote binational exchange of 
information between state or local public health agencies, regarding a particular public 
health event, should communicate with their federal counterparts in the neighboring 
country before directly interacting with state and local levels of that country. 
 
While communications transmitted in the language of the other country are encouraged, 
communications in the language of the provider country are acceptable means of 
information exchange for the purposes contemplated in these Guidelines.  
 
2.5. Confidentiality, protection of privacy, and dissemination of information 
Epidemiological information may be sensitive in nature.  Inappropriately handled 
information may expose individuals, communities and countries to stigma or discredit, 
affecting their stability, security and wellbeing. Therefore, both countries should protect 
the information shared by the neighboring country and establish secure mechanisms and 
tools for transmitting and storing all information shared by the other country.   
 
Information exchange discussed in this document aims to facilitate effective and timely 
public health action. This information should not be disseminated outside the purview of 
relevant public health authorities unless by mutual agreement or if it has been made 
public by the provider country. If public health agencies or institutions of the country 
receiving the information are obligated to share data beyond its original purpose because 
of legal requirements – such as judicial order or freedom of information acts – or they 
become aware of an unintentional leak of information, they should warn as soon as 
possible the relevant public health agencies of the provider country.  
 
2.6.   Joint Action to Respond to an Public Health Event  
When an epidemiologic event occurs involving both countries and both have an interest 
in investigating the event (such as an outbreak investigation), the two countries should 
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make a determined effort to conduct the investigation together.  In this situation, the 
national public health agency of the country in which the study will take place should 
assume the coordinating role in accordance with its jurisdiction. At all times, the 
receiving country has the prerogative of cancelling an invitation or finalizing the joint 
investigation of a particular public health event. In Mexico inviting or declining the 
collaboration of another country’s health officials is an attribution reserved to the federal 
government, whether or not federal health agencies or personnel participate in 
epidemiological investigations or disease control measures of a particular public health 
event.  
 
Each country should be expected to provide the technical and financial support needed 
for its participation, recognizing that this will be subject to the availability of funds and 
the applicable provisions of the respective country.  Sharing of resources, e.g. laboratory 
testing, may be necessary, is highly encouraged, and should be negotiated in a timely 
fashion.  The timeliness of the investigation should be accorded a high priority by both 
countries.  When rapid action is appropriate, the deployment of a team of the country 
where the outbreak is occurring should not be slowed by the delayed mobilization of the 
corresponding team from the other country; that is, the response to the event by the 
affected country should not be delayed pending arrival of the team of the other country.     
 
2.7.   Differences between Health Systems   
The roles of public health agencies or institutions of the United States and Mexico at the 
different levels of government are not always the same.  In the United States, the public 
health sector is primarily state-based.  In Mexico, although states are legally competent 
for performing some public health activities, these are subject to the overall direction of 
the Secretaria de Salud of the Federal Government.  Such differences should be taken 
into consideration in mounting the necessary responses when the two countries face an 
epidemiologic event requiring collaboration.   
 
2.8.   Respect for the Sovereignty and Laws of Each Country 
The responsibility for all public health responses to binational events lies with the public 
health agencies or institutions of the country where the respective activities will take 
place.  All parties recognize the need for these same public health agencies or institutions 
to operate within the legal framework established by that country.  If legal or other 
barriers are identified which limit the capacity of public health agencies or institutions to 
collaborate with counterpart agencies of the other country in the most effective way, the 
public health agencies should investigate possible solutions to such barriers.   
 
3. Legal Framework  
  
 The following section reviews the legal framework currently in place for implementing 
these Guidelines, from the perspective of the U.S. federal and state governments and the 
Government of Mexico.   
 
Federal and State Governments of the United States 
 
The Public Health Service Act (42 USC § 241 et seq.) provides the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) with a broad authority to conduct activities relating to the 
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prevention and control of diseases and injuries.  It also authorizes HHS to participate with 
other countries in cooperative endeavors to advance health sciences and improve the 
health of Americans (42 U.S.C. § 242l).  Requirements for disease reporting are typically 
defined in laws at the state and local level.  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), however, together with the Council of State and Territorial 
Epidemiologists (CSTE) have defined a list of nationally notifiable diseases and 
conditions, and states provide information about these to CDC’s National Notifiable 
Diseases Surveillance System and other CDC surveillance systems.  In addition, ships 
and airlines are required by federal regulation to report deaths or ill passengers to CDC 
quarantine stations.  CDC also operates various surveillance systems that track particular 
disease problems of national interest.   
 
The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC § 552a) establishes a code of fair information practices 
that governs the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about 
individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal agencies. A system of 
records is a group of records under the control of an agency from which information is 
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifier assigned to the individual.  
The Privacy Act requires that agencies give the public notice of their systems of records 
by publication in the Federal Register.  The Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of a 
record about an individual from a system of records absent the written consent of the 
individual, unless the disclosure is pursuant to one of twelve statutory exceptions. The 
Act also provides individuals with a means by which to seek access to and amendment of 
their records, and sets forth various agency record-keeping requirements.  While the Act 
sets controls on the terms by which federal agencies can gather, maintain, and 
disseminate personal information, it also defines circumstances in which disclosure of 
information is permissible without the subject’s consent.  This includes disclosure “to a 
person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety 
of an individual” if notice of the disclosure is transmitted to the individual’s last known 
address and pursuant to a routine use as defined in the system of records published by the 
agency.  The system of records applicable to most of CDC’s surveillance projects, 
“Epidemiologic Studies and Surveillance of Disease Problems” authorizes, among other 
things, disclosure to “cooperating medical authorities.”  
 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 USC § 552)  provides that any person has a 
right to obtain access to federal agency records, except to the extent that such records (or 
portions of them) are protected from public disclosure by one of nine exemptions or by 
one of three special law enforcement record exclusions.  It applies only to federal records, 
though U.S. states have their own equivalent statutes.  The FOIA provides access to all 
federal agency records except for those records (or portions of records) that are protected 
from disclosure.  
 
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
Privacy Rule regulates how “covered entities” – e.g. healthcare providers, health plans, 
health billing services – use and disclose certain individually identifiable health 
information known as “protected health information” (PHI).  While CDC is not 
considered a “covered entity,” some state and local health departments may be. The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule recognizes the legitimate need for public health authorities and 
others responsible for ensuring public health and safety to have access to PHI to carry out 
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their public health mission.  The Privacy Rule permits covered entities to disclose PHI, 
without authorization from the subject, to public health authorities (e.g., CDC, State and 
local health departments) that are legally authorized to receive such reports for purposes 
of preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability.  This includes, for example, 
reporting of disease or injury; reporting vital events, such as births or deaths; and 
conducting public health surveillance, investigations, or interventions.  At the direction of 
a public health authority, covered entities may disclose PHI to a foreign government 
agency that is acting in collaboration with a public health authority (45 CFR 
164.512(b)(1)(i)).  Covered entities may only disclose the minimum PHI necessary to 
accomplish the permitted purpose (45 CFR 164.502(b)(1)).  However, the covered entity 
may reasonably rely on the representation of a public official requesting the information 
that it constitutes the minimum necessary (45 CFR 164.514(d)(3)(iii)(A)).  
 
Under the U.S. federal system, each state enacts health and safety laws within their 
jurisdictions.  Each state must review its laws relating to these Guidelines to determine 
whether legal authority exists to exchange public health information and to collaborate in 
other ways with counterparts in Mexico on public health issues of mutual interest.  Some 
states have examined their legislation, seeking to identify potential barriers to the sharing 
of epidemiologic information with Mexico.
1,2  
All states are encouraged to complete an 
analysis of their laws for this purpose.  In those cases where barriers are identified, states 
are encouraged to consider new legislation that would provide such authority, based on 
the value of such collaboration for the improvement of public health in our countries. 
Mexico’s local, state and federal health agencies reserve the right to limit sharing of 
information with those states whose legal barriers limit the exchange of epidemiologic 
information with Mexico. 
 
In summary, U.S. federal legislation permits the sharing of epidemiologic information by 
federal agencies with a foreign country for the prevention or control of disease, with 
necessary restrictions based on confidentiality.  Each state needs to review its own 
legislation to determine whether barriers exist to the exchange of such information.  If 
present, this legislation should be reconsidered to ensure that state public health officials 
have the needed authority to improve the public’s health through the sharing of such 
information.  With the requisite authority under state law, states would be constitutionally 
permitted to enter into cooperative arrangements with each other and with Mexican states 
for the purpose of sharing epidemiologic information.  
 
Federal Government of Mexico 
 
The legal framework of Mexico for epidemiologic surveillance and health information is 
composed of a set of legal arrangements that include the Mexican Constitution, laws, 
regulations, decrees, secretarial agreements, norms, agreements and guidelines of the 
National Epidemiologic Surveillance Technical Sectorial Committee Specialized in 
Health (Annex 1).  Among the most prominent are the following. 
                                                 
1
 Barriers to Binational Cooperation in Public Health between Texas and Mexico, Office of Border Health, 
Texas Department of Health, 2001  
2
 Annual Border Health Status Report, 2001: Barriers to California-Mexico Collaboration in Public Health, 




The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, in its Article 4, Paragraph 4, 
establishes the right of health protection .  Article 73, Section XVI, first basis, establishes 
the General Public Health Council (GPHC), a body of the Mexican State directly 
dependent of the President of the Republic, chaired by the Secretary of Health.  The 
GPHC has authority to issue mandatory provisions in public health. The Council is the 
second health authority in the country, preceded only by the President of the Republic.  
 
The General Health Law (GHL) describes the terms for the application of the universal 
right to health protection established in Article 4 of the Constitution. This law is 
mandatory for all public and private entities and individuals in Mexico. The GHL defines 
General Public Health and determines the respective competencies and collaboration of 
the Federal and State governments in the matter. 
 
The Federal Law of Transparence and Access to Public Governmental Information 
(FLTAPGI) establishes the rules and mechanisms to assure persons have access to 
information stored by the Federal Government or autonomous institutions, except for 
information that is classified as reserved.  All 32 states in Mexico have similar bylaws. 
 
The reform of FLTAPGI, published in the Official Journal of the Federation on July 5, 
2010, defines the mode in which personal data will be handled and establishes principles 
and procedures to store, transmit, and limit access to data containing private or 
confidential information of persons. Although this law generally inhibits transmission of 
nominal data, it contemplates the use of such information for specific technical purposes 
of governmental agencies, provided the appropriate mechanisms are observed to avoid 
unintentional transmission of information beyond the intended agencies and purposes. 
 
The Mexican Official Norms for Epidemiologic Surveillance (NOM 017-SSA2-1994) 
and Health Information (NOM 040-SSA2-2004) determine institutional responsibilities 
and procedures to conduct surveillance, including notification, data integration and 
communication.  
 
The Mexican constitution in Article 117, Fraction I, states that “the States cannot, under 
any circumstance, sign agreement, treaty or coalition with another State or foreign 
power…” [but, similarly to the United States, they may be able to sign non-binding 
agreements]. 
 
In summary, no part of relevant Mexican laws contemplates sharing public health 
information with other countries but also does not forbid sharing of such information 
internationally.  Mexican law determines disease prevention and control in Mexico to be 
an exclusive attribution of Mexican health authorities, but allows the Federal Government 
to establish specific collaboration agreements with other parties, including international 




Other United States–Mexico Collaborations 
 
These Guidelines are also consistent with other terms agreed to between public health 
authorities of the two countries.  In March 2008, HHS and SSA established a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Public Health and 
Science, providing a “framework to encourage bilateral cooperation” in which efforts are 
meant to “foster collaboration where areas of mutual interest exist.”  Among the areas 
cited for cooperation is “the detection, surveillance, and reporting of infectious and 
chronic diseases, to enable better tracking and analyses of prevalence and trends, so as to 
improve the prevention and care of, and the response to these diseases.”  In 2007, a 
mutual assistance agreement also was adopted by the United States, Mexico and Canada 
for addressing public health emergencies, referring to the sharing of information, and 
implementation of protocols for laboratory collaborations, among other areas. 
 
Other existing mechanisms for collaboration between governments of the two countries 
on public health issues include the United States – Mexico Border Health Commission, 
the United States–Mexico Food Safety Cooperative Agreement, the Border Governor’s 
Conference, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) El Paso Field Office, border 
state Memoranda of Understanding, and Binational Health Councils of border Sister 
Cities.  Joint public health collaborations are in place between the two countries in the 
areas of tuberculosis (Ten Against TB, Binational TB Card), infectious disease 
surveillance (Border Infectious Disease Surveillance – BIDS, Early Warning Infectious 
Disease Surveillance – EWIDS), influenza and others.   
 
In conclusion, the legal frameworks of the two countries at the national level allow for 
the exchange of information, as proposed in these Guidelines.  States or federal entities 
that are part of each of the countries will need to analyze their own local legal framework 
in order to verify that its arrangements are aligned with and complement the Guidelines 
provided here.  Numerous interfaces are already in place between health authorities of the 
United States and Mexico, reflecting the need and desire to assist each other in 
confronting shared public health challenges.  
 
 
4. Scope of Public Health Events 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to characterize the scope or range of public health events 
for which both countries determine that exchange of epidemiologic information is 
appropriate.  It is understood that the information to be shared by one country has the 
objective of leading to or facilitating action in the second country which will be of direct 
benefit to the health of the population of one or both countries.  This would include:  
 
A. Cases of disease identified in one country for which there is evidence or reason to 
suspect an epidemiologic link to the other country, including diseases detected in 
animals, or that such a link may occur in the future due to expected travel to the 
neighboring country;  
 
B. Similarly, the identification of risk factors for disease in one country that may 
lead to disease in the other country. When a country identifies risk factors for 
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disease in a location outside its territory that may affect the neighboring country, 
efforts should be done to timely share relevant information with the potentially 
affected country.    
 
Types of public health events that meet these criteria include, but are not limited to: 
 
 A probable or confirmed case of any severe or otherwise important infectious 
disease with high potential for spread to the other country 
 Infections in animals or vectors with potential for spread of severe or 
potentially severe disease to humans 
 A probable or confirmed case of severe or potentially severe disease suspected 
of having been intentionally spread 
 Disease outbreaks involving both countries at the time of discovery or which 
have a significant potential for spread to the other country  
 Outbreaks of disease associated with travel or migration to the other country 
 Outbreaks of disease or chemical contamination associated with food or other 
products originating in the other country 
 Environmental health emergencies potentially or actually affecting both 
countries 
 Binational cases of pre-established/or agreed notifiable diseases 
 
There is a tremendous interaction between the United States and Mexico, reflected by 
almost 128 million visitors from Mexico to the United States and almost 95 million US 
visitors to Mexico in 2005.
3
 While border region traffic makes up the majority of such 
travel, travel occurs between all regions of Mexico and the United States.  For example, 
over 65% of US air travelers to Mexico in 2010 flew to Mexico City, Cancun and 
Guadalajara.  Therefore, the potential of a public health event to be binational should be 
considered throughout the full reach of both countries.   
 
 
5. Specific Guidelines  
 
This section presents specific guidelines for different types of events and for different 
areas of collaboration.   
 
5.1. Binational Public Health Events 
Binational public health events are those potentially or actually affecting individuals or 
populations in both countries. Binational events encompass cases, outbreaks, threats and 





As stated earlier, a binational case refers to an individual who is a confirmed or probable 
case of an infectious disease or ailment, notifiable in either country, who may have 
                                                 
3
 North American Transportation Statistics, http://nats.sct.gob.mx/nats/sys/tables 
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acquired or may transmit the disease in the other country, or who may require binational 
collaboration for investigation, management or control. 
An example of a binational case is a person with tuberculosis (TB) under treatment who 
crosses the border during the course of his or her medical care and public health follow-
up.  Such a binational TB case is thus at risk for interruptions in treatment with the 
consequent possibility of transmitting TB to others, as well as of developing drug 
resistant tuberculosis.  Based on the “Need to Share Information” (General Principle 2.1 
of these guidelines) identification of binational cases by public health authorities warrants 
the sharing of relevant information with counterparts of the neighboring country to assist 
in finding exposed individuals and other cases, to limit the risks of further disease 
transmission, and to ensure adequate control of the disease among identified cases. 
1.  Identification of Binational Cases – The determination of whether or not a 
person with a notifiable disease is a binational case requires obtaining information 
that currently is not routinely gathered.  States should encourage health 
professionals making disease notifications of the need to explore whether cases 
are binational, especially in settings where this is more likely to occur (locations 
with considerable travel between the countries, migrant populations, etc.).  In the 
future, public health authorities should consider the value of incorporating 
information specifically designed to identify binational cases along with the other 
information to be routinely reported.  A list of potential diseases defining 
binational cases and questions designed to elicit such information should be 
prepared as part of the implementation phase of these Guidelines, being careful 
not to exclude unknown or unspecific events that are binational by nature (eg. 
environmental exposures, infectious disease pandemics, etc.).   
 
2.  Notification of Binational Cases – Recognizing that binational cases, by 
definition, imply a public health risk to the neighboring country and usually 
require prompt public health action, binational cases of notifiable infectious 
diseases should be promptly reported to the appropriate public health official(s) in 
the neighboring country.  Public health authorities of both countries should 
become familiar with the list of conditions that are notifiable in each country. The 
questions contained in the decision tool of the IHR Annex 2 may help to assess 
whether a particular condition in an individual should be regarded as a binational 
case, as well as whether it is considered notifiable under the IHR. 
 
3.  Information on Binational Cases – When necessary, the information shared on 
binational cases should be sufficient to allow appropriate public health follow-up 
of the case to take place.  In some circumstances, this may entail sharing patient 
identifying information.  Following the public health laws and privacy regulations 
of both countries, information exchange needs to be handled confidentially. 
Health officials receiving identifying information should use it responsibly for the 
sole purpose of instrumenting public health action.    
 
4. Timely Reporting of Binational Cases – Time frames should be established by 
both countries for reporting binational case to public health authorities.  Urgently 
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notifiable conditions, as defined by the relevant agencies, should be reported 
within 24 hours following a first identification.  
 
5. Procedures for Notification of Binational Cases – Clear mechanisms of 
notification should be established by public health officials of both countries, at 
the different levels of government, which specify: 
 Counterpart agency and corresponding office to notify 
 Channels, tools and formats of for communication that minimize delay in 
receiving the notification and assure safe and confidential transactions 
(e.g. telephone, fax, email, electronic file, secure web-based systems, etc.) 
 Information to be included regarding the binational case(s) 
 
6. Follow-up Information on Binational Cases – The two countries should 
exchange follow-up information on binational cases so that the effectiveness of 
binational case notification and coordinated case management and investigations 
can be determined.  Public health officials of both countries should agree on 
protocols for case follow-up.  
 
Binational Outbreaks  
 
The term outbreak refers to an increase in the expected number of cases of a specific 
disease or other health problem in a given population over a defined time period.  The 
number of cases required to consider a cluster of disease cases an outbreak thus obviously 
depends on historical epidemiologic data and diagnostic criteria and laboratory resources.  
A single case of a rare disease, such as cholera, or an eradicated disease such as 
smallpox, may constitute an outbreak, while numerous cases of more common diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis may be required to be considered an outbreak.  Newer 
diagnostic capabilities, such as molecular fingerprinting techniques, can identify a cluster 
of illnesses with indistinguishable molecular characteristics; epidemiological 
investigation is then used to find links between these cases in the cluster.  This 
combination of molecular characterization of microbes and epidemiological investigation 
has identified numerous outbreaks, including widely dispersed outbreaks that would 
otherwise have gone undetected. An outbreak is considered binational:  
 when disease exposures occur in one country to visitors or migrants of the other 
country,  
 when disease is associated with products from the other country 
 when environmental/ecologic exposures causing disease simultaneously affect 
both countries, or  
 when cases appear in border settings involving the population from both 
countries.   
 
Upon recognition of a binational outbreak, if new cases continue to appear or exposure to 
causal agents persists, a rapid response should be organized to accurately diagnose the 
illness, to determine the scale of the outbreak, to identify significant risk factors, or to 
implement appropriate preventive and control measures.  Coordination between public 
health agencies or institutions of the two countries is essential for meeting the needs of all 




1. Preparing for Binational Outbreaks – Pre-event preparations that should be 
implemented include:  
 Exchange updated lists of binational contact information at the local, state, 
and federal levels, including information that provide for round-the-clock 
availability 
 Establish mechanisms for communication in both Spanish and English 
 Define and practice communication protocols for notification to public health 
officials 
 Plan for needed responses for diverse kinds of public health threats  
 Establish mechanisms for the transportation of specimens or needed supplies 
through U.S. and Mexican customs 
 
2. Communications among Health Authorities during Binational Outbreaks  
Once a binational outbreak is identified, the appropriate public health officials 
should be notified, following a pre-defined communications protocol.  The public 
health authorities from each country should share the available data, and take a 
decision on the most appropriate response, including a decision whether or not to 
initiate a binational investigation.  
 
3. Collaborative Investigations of Binational Outbreaks – Upon binational 
concurrence to conduct a binational investigation or response effort, a binational 
oversight team of public health officials from the two countries should meet.  
Unless defined otherwise, the coordination of the investigation will be the 
responsibility of the lead public health authority where the outbreak is to be 
investigated. Agreement of the Mexican Federal Public Health authorities is 
always required when a binational team is expected to work in Mexican territory. 
The oversight team should be responsible for or coordinate:   
 choosing the members of the binational field investigation team, including a 
team leader from each country  
 field work preparation, including arrangements for any necessary travel, 
personal protective gear, prophylaxis, and availability of supplies and 
equipment 
 planning and implementation of the investigation  
 content of health alerts and press releases 
 determination of control measures based on information provided by field 
staff  
 administrative arrangements and logistics to support the binational team  
 
4. Resources for Collaborative Investigations – Each country is responsible for 
funding the travel of participants of that country in the investigating team.  
Primary resources needed for the investigation itself should be the responsibility 
of the lead public health agency where the investigation takes place.  In the 
absence of needed supplies or investigative capacity (e.g. select laboratory 





5. Binational Cooperation in Sharing Public Health Resources – National and 
state public health agencies or institutions are encouraged to share informational 
and other resources designed to strengthen the epidemiology and response 
capacity of binational counterparts.  Joint participation by multinational agencies 
(e.g. PAHO/WHO) and NGOs (e.g. TEPHINET) may provide additional 
opportunities to identify such needs and appropriately collaborate with the U.S. 
and Mexican Public Health authorities.  
 
5.2. Foodborne Disease Outbreaks 
Contaminated foods are responsible for many infections and toxic exposures.  Within the 
United States, foodborne diseases are estimated to be responsible annually for 48 million 
illnesses and 3,000 deaths.  The growing international trade of agricultural products has 
correspondingly been associated with outbreaks due to pathogens transmitted by foods 
imported from another country.  The United States and Mexico have collaborated in 
responding to several such outbreaks.   
 
The organization of governmental roles in food safety often includes multiple agencies in 
both the health and agricultural sectors, and at the federal, state and local levels.  To 
facilitate needed collaboration, a clear definition of the different roles of such agencies 
must be understood by neighboring countries, including the responsibility of each in 
responding to outbreaks of foodborne diseases.   
 
At the national level within the United States, the CDC is responsible for surveillance of 
human illness caused by foodborne disease and for epidemiological and laboratory 
investigation of outbreaks of foodborne illness.  The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for regulating meat, poultry, and processed egg 
products.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for regulating all 
other foods, which includes seafood, dairy products, fruits, vegetables, and shell eggs, 
among other products. 
 
At the state level in the United States, the foodborne illness surveillance and investigation 
responsibility rests with the health agency at the state and local level, while the regulatory 
responsibility may rest with the agriculture department or the health department at the 
state level or the local health agency at the local level. When states want assistance from 
the CDC for foodborne outbreak investigations, state officials must make a formal 
request to CDC because CDC does not send investigators without an invitation from state 
officials.  In the event of an inter-state or international foodborne outbreak, the FDA 
and/or USDA would be contacted in order to cooperate with multiple jurisdictions in 
coordinating the outbreak investigation, including traceback, trace-forward and potential 
product recall. 
 
At the local government level in the United States, there is wide variation in food safety 
roles and responsibilities among the 3000 local health agencies. In many localities, 
sanitarians have the primary responsibility for investigating reports of foodborne illness 
related to food service establishments, whereas in other localities reports of foodborne 
illness are investigated by state officials and the local sanitarians serve in a secondary 




Within Mexico, the National Service for Agro-alimentary Health, Safety and Quality 
(SENASICA) is a decentralized organ of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural 
Development, Fisheries and Food (Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo 
Rural, Pesca y Alimentación).  The Federal Commission for Protection against Sanitary 
Risks (COFEPRIS) is the decentralized organ of the Secretaria de Salud, with 
jurisdiction over control and public health surveillance of food and drinks, pesticides, 
plant nutrients, toxic or otherwise dangerous substances, biotechnology products, food 
supplements, raw materials and additives used in manufacturing of these products, among 
others. . When informed by any domestic or international party of a foodborne disease 
outbreak associated with a product from Mexico or other country, COFEPRIS 
coordinates internally and externally with other government agencies, according to the 
nature of the event.  
 
The complexity of institutional organization on food safety in both countries creates an 
important need for collaboration between federal, state, and local authorities across 
international borders. 
 
Foodborne disease outbreaks often imply the need for two or more stages of 
investigation.  The first stage is the primary epidemiologic and environmental 
investigation which aims to identify the agent, the food vehicle and how the food became 
contaminated.  Traceback of the food vehicle will indicate whether it is a domestic or 
imported product.  In the latter case, and if the food product is suspected to have been 
contaminated at its point of origin, further traceback investigation of the implicated food 
product  should determine its source. Additional investigation may identify how the food 
product became contaminated, where the most effective opportunity for future prevention 
exists and the need for regulatory action.  These investigations represent important 
opportunities for collaboration between the two countries.   
 
1. Regulatory Responsibilities in Foodborne Disease Outbreaks – Given that 
public health actions related to products fall under the legal responsibility of 
regulatory agencies, sharing of information should be conducted in accordance 
with the policies of those agencies and within the framework of the existing 
arrangements between the food regulatory agencies in Mexico and the United 
States.   
 
2. Trade-related Implications – Recognizing that foodborne outbreaks can have 
significant effects on trade, each country should conduct investigations and other 
activities in compliance with any applicable trade obligations.  Epidemiologic 
conclusions should be based on highly reliable scientific methods providing 
results which are shared with counterpart agencies in the other country. 
 
3. Advanced Diagnostic Technologies – The use of advanced technologies (e.g. 
pulsed field gel electrophoresis) for subtyping of human and food isolates should 
be encouraged, as well as the sharing of findings from such technologies with 
counterparts in the two countries.  
 
4. Confidentiality and Information Sharing – Public health agencies or 
institutions and food safety regulatory agencies in both countries are obliged to 
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maintain the confidentiality of patient identification and trade secret information 
in accordance with their respective laws, practices and policies.  Quick sharing of 
specific information among relevant agencies in both countries on the number and 
locations of persons who have become ill, the associated epidemiologic 
information implicating food vehicles, as well as the point of origin and total 
distribution of the implicated foods, is important to the rapid, appropriate and 
effective response to a binational outbreak of foodborne disease. The parameters 
that define which data should be shared and the conditions under which data 
sharing can legally occur should be determined in advance for binational food 
safety emergencies. 
 
5.3 Potential Terrorist Events of Public Health Importance 
The possibility of introduction of biologic, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents by 
way of the United States-Mexico border or the intentional release of an agent in one 
country with transmission to the other makes this an issue of interest to both countries.  
Such a scenario could include the appearance of cases in the border region which would 
require close binational coordination.   
 
The suspicion or identification of such an event as being intentional would lead to the 
application of legal arrangements other than those addressed in these Guidelines and 
potential participation of other agencies outside the health sector, with which national 
public health agencies or institutions would need to cooperate, as defined in their 
respective national emergency response plans.   
 
Since disease arising by intentional spread may well appear without previous notice, 
health officials should be aware of suggestive features of such an incident, including the 
following:  
 
 An outbreak of an unusual syndrome or disease, compatible with agents 
associated with bioterrorism, especially when occurring in a discrete population. 
 Many cases of unexplained diseases or deaths 
 More severe disease than is usually expected for a specific pathogen or failure to 
respond to standard therapy 
 A disease that is unusual for a given geographic area or transmission season. 
 Multiple simultaneous or serial epidemics of different diseases in the same 
population 
 Unusual strains or variants of organisms or antimicrobial resistance patterns 
different from those circulating 
 Similar genetic typing of agents isolated from distinct sources at different times or 
locations 
 Intelligence of a potential attack, claims by a terrorist or aggressor of a release, 
and other evidence suggesting terrorist intent  
 Other unusual situations4,5  
                                                 
4
 Recognition of Illness Associated with the Intentional Release of a Biologic Agent, MMWR 2001 Oct 
19;50(41):893-897. 
5





1. Emergency Communications Channel – The program units for public health 
emergencies in the two countries, including their directors and directories, should 
be known to each other.  Both program units should have a mechanism permitting 
direct contact on a continuous basis (i.e. 24 hours/day, 7 days/week, 365 
days/year). 
 
2. Communication of a Suspected Incident – Suspicion of any intentional health 
incident which presents a risk to citizens of the other country should be urgently 
communicated to the counterpart agency responsible for such emergencies. 
 
3. Ongoing Information Exchange – As such an incident evolves, information 
should be regularly exchanged at commonly decided intervals between 
corresponding public health emergency program units of both countries. 
 
4. Resource Sharing in Emergencies – In preparation for such potential events, 
arrangements should be established between the public health authorities of the 
two countries – including local, state and federal levels – regarding the sharing of 
health resources during public health emergencies, together with expedited 
clearance procedures for cross–border transfer of such resources by immigration 
and custom officials, when such a public health emergency is formally declared. 
 
5. Adherence to Outbreak Guidelines – Cooperation in the investigation of such 
incidents is strongly encouraged and should follow the same guidelines as for 
naturally occurring outbreaks. 
 
6. Quarantine or Isolation of Foreign Citizens – In the event that quarantine or 
isolation are considered necessary by the public health agency of a country that 
will include citizens of the other country, subject to all other treaty or 
international law obligations, this decision should be communicated urgently to 
the counterpart public health agency of the other country.  The public health 
agency enacting the quarantine or isolation should recognize the special needs of 
citizens of the other country who are caught outside their place of residence, while 
still ensuring the effectiveness of the quarantine or isolation measure. 
 
5.4 Laboratory Issues 
Laboratories serve a unique role in both surveillance and investigation of health 
problems.  The purpose of this section is to establish guidelines for laboratories when 
significant health events of binational interest occur that will benefit from a collaborative 
response by both nations. 
 
The availability of laboratories and the complexity of testing that those laboratories are 
capable of performing vary along the length of the border in the two countries.  This may 
lead to periodic use of laboratories by border clinicians or patients in the neighboring 
country.  In addition, disease outbreaks or emergency preparedness plans may lead to 
decisions to share laboratory resources.  In such cases, minimizing the time required for 
laboratory diagnosis and confirmatory testing is critical to timely identification of health 
problems and disease outbreaks so that appropriate and timely control measures can be 
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implemented.  This is particularly important when considering bioterrorism events and 
outbreaks of highly communicable diseases such as pandemic influenza or Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) which have the potential to cause substantial health, 
social, and economic problems. 
 
Each of the specific items detailed below should be addressed in establishing an efficient, 
highly functional, binational framework for laboratories to develop the needed 
capabilities for responding effectively to disease outbreaks and other health challenges 
impacting both countries. 
 
1. Binational Reporting of Notifiable Diseases – When a laboratory in one country 
analyzes or examines specimens from a person residing in the other country, and 
obtains a positive result for a reportable condition, this information should be 
routinely communicated to the appropriate public health officials where the tested 
individual resides.  The mechanism for making this communication should be 
determined by the respective state public health agencies working in coordination 
with relevant public and private laboratories and with its counterparts in the 
neighboring country.   
 
2. Transport of Laboratory Samples through Customs – In cases where 
specimens of public health interest need to be carried across the border for testing 
in a laboratory of the other country, mechanisms should be established to assure 
expedited passage through customs, since excessive delay may compromise the 
quality of the specimen and the ability to obtain an accurate diagnosis.  This is 
likely to require the stimulus of prior coordination among the involved agencies, 
including the customs authority, specifying a clearly defined protocol to be 
followed for the rapid, cross-border transport of a set of specimens.   
 
3. Standards for Sample Transport – Specimens being sent for testing in the 
neighboring country should follow national and international standards for the 
labeling, packaging and transport of such material.  In laboratories that may 
participate in such collaborative testing, specific training on implementation of 
these standards should be provided to responsible personnel in these areas, 
together with written instructions.   
 
4. Authorized Request for Laboratory Testing – Submission of samples for 
diagnostic testing by a laboratory of the neighboring country should be preceded 
by communication between authorized public health officials of the two countries, 
with approval of the receiving laboratory. Upon arrival of the specimen, 
confirmation should be sent to the agency submitting the specimens for testing.  
In situations where there is potential for the receiving laboratory to be sent a large 
number of specimens, a triaging policy should be established in anticipation to 
define the priority of received samples for urgent testing, and inform referring 
agencies of this policy.   
 
5. Reporting of Laboratory Results – Laboratory results should be communicated 
promptly to the requesting public health agency on a confidential basis.  The 
agency submitting specimens for testing should be responsible for any public 
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release of findings.  When appropriate, specific protocols may be agreed upon 
which dictate alternate procedures.   
 
6. Binational Laboratory Collaboration – Collaborative activities between cross-
border laboratories is encouraged to enhance the scope of diagnostic capabilities 
available and the quality of the services provided.  This may include training, 
provision of equipment, supplies and/or reagents, and participation in quality 
assurance programs.  For cross-border transport of specimens, agreements 
between regulatory, public health agencies and customs authorities should be 
promoted to define protocols which facilitate the passage of such material.  Roles 
of national and state public health agencies for coordination of such activities 
should be defined by each country. 
 
5.5 Public Health Risk Assessment and Communications 
 
5.5.1 Risk assessment 
Risk assessment is a fundamental element of effective public health response. Assessing 
the risk of public health events involves both quantitative and qualitative efforts to 
estimate the probability of harmful effects to populations from certain disease events or 
human activities.  Risk assessments are formally conducted for Public Health 
Emergencies of International Concern reported to WHO using the International Health 
Regulations decision algorithms and by each country’s health agencies for a variety of 
situations, for example outbreaks that may lead to travel advisories, or emergency events 
caused by radiation.  Each country should make every effort to share risk assessments for 
situations potentially affecting the neighboring country.  In certain situations, such as 
events in border sister cities, joint risk assessments may be appropriate.  Each country 
should make an effort to be responsive to a request from the neighboring country for a 
risk assessment on a situation for which that country indicates concern.  Mechanisms for 
sharing risk assessments and making joint risk assessments when appropriate should be 
established.     
  
5.5.2 Communications 
As expressed throughout this document, successful binational exchange of epidemiologic 
information for public health depends on timely and clear communication of accurate 
information between appropriate public health authorities of the U.S. and Mexico.  
Failure to do so can result not only in an inadequate public health response to prevent and 
control disease among binational populations, but also to misunderstandings between 
officials and the populations of both countries.  Such misunderstandings can undermine 
mutual trust and confidence and can create distorted and unequal perceptions of the 
epidemiologic situation affecting the two countries.  For these reasons, establishing clear 
mechanisms and protocols for public health communications between the two countries is 




Communications between Public Health Agencies or Institutions 
 
1. Existing Information Sources – To facilitate the exchange of information 
recommended in this document, public health agencies should consult and 
subscribe to those information outlets provided by the other country (e.g. 
publications, press releases, Boletín Epidemiología, Health Alert Network, Epi-
X). 
 
2. Communications between Public Health Agencies or Institutions – Direct 
communications between corresponding programs and staff of counterpart public 
health agencies or institutions of the neighboring country should be encouraged 
(e.g. to contact a known staff member in the measles unit to report a case of 
binational interest).  However for cases in which program staff are not known or 
cannot be reached, or for emergencies and other broader issues of common 
interest, counterpart agencies of the two countries should each have a pre-
established mechanism (telephone contact number and email address) which is 
staffed at all times for such communications.  In the case of binational events 
requiring continued collaboration, the communications offices of counterpart 
agencies should be in regular contact, exchanging relevant information and 
coordinating the release of information to the public. 
 
Release of Information to the Public 
 
3. Harmonization of Public Information – In cases of binational epidemiologic 
events, information released to the public by the two countries regarding the 
event, risk factors and preventive measures should be consistent, based on the best 
available scientific evidence of the event itself, and the pathogens or substances 
involved.  Ideally, the population of each country should receive such information 
from their public health authorities in the same time period, to avoid creation of 
unexpected demands on public health authorities from one-sided releases, and to 
reinforce their credibility to the public. 
 
4. Sharing of Information for the Public – In the case of a binational public health 
emergency or outbreak affecting the population of both countries, copies of 
information made available to the public by the respective public health agency 
should be shared with the counterpart agency of the other country.  In non-
emergency circumstances, such information should be made available on request. 
 
5. Travel Notices – Travel notices are posted by public health authorities to provide 
information to travelers, the public, healthcare providers and public health 
authorities regarding outbreaks of disease of public health significance.  The 
character of the notification is based on four criteria relating to disease 
transmission, containment measures, quality of surveillance, and quality and 
accessibility of medical care.  In the case of such travel notices or other 
communications to the public which could have negative impact on trade, tourism 
or other industries, the counterpart agency should be given prior notice of the 
action to be taken and the evidence supporting that decision for their review and, 
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if appropriate, their response. The IHR (2005) should be always considered when 
making these decisions. 
 
6. Next Steps 
 
The intent of the two countries is that the completion of these Guidelines be followed by 
the elaboration of a set of protocols to guide the implementation of these 
recommendations by the public health agencies or institutions of each country.  This 
process should be undertaken with broad binational participation of the major public 
health agencies or institutions at the state and federal levels.  
 
Finally, based on the experience accumulated in the functional implementation of the 
Guidelines to date, it appears likely that they will evolve over time, and new or revised 
needs will be identified.  In anticipation of this, a binational technical working group 
should review this document annually, to assess its continued validity, and to update the 
Guidelines as needed.  Nevertheless, these Guidelines will remain applicable as long as 
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Annex: Mexico’s Legal Framework for Epidemiologic Surveillance 
 
1. Constitution of Mexico 




General Health Law. 
Articles: 17B, 133, part II, Chapter II of “Infectious Diseases” 134 to 157, 181, 353, 358, 
359, 360 and 408 and others relating to epidemiologic issues.   
 
Federal Law for the Control of Chemical Precursors, Essential Chemical Products and 
Machinery for Producing Capsules, Tablets and Pills 
Official Journal of the Federation 26 Dec 1997. 
 
Biosafety Law on Genetically Modified Organisms 
Official Journal of the Federation 18 Mar 2005. 
 
Customs Law 
Official Journal of the Federation 15 Dec 1995. 
 
Organic Law of Federal Public Administration 
Official Journal of the Federation 29 Dec 1976 
Last Alteration Official Journal of the Federation 17 Jun 2009. 
 
Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Governmental Information 
Official Journal of the Federation 11 June 2002 
Last Alteration Official Journal of the Federation 05 Jul 2010. 
 
General Law of Civil Defense 
Official Journal of the Federation 12 May 2000 
Last Alteration Journal of the Federation 24 Apr 2006. 
 
Federal Law for Protection of Personal Data Held by Individuals  
Official Journal of the Federation 05 Jul 2010. 
 
3. Regulations  
 
Regulation of the General Health Law regarding International Sanitary Issues.  
Official Journal of the Federation 18 Feb 1985. 
Errata Official Journal of the Federation 10 Jul 1985. 
 
Regulation of the General Health Law regarding Sanitary Control for the Disposition of 
Organs, Tissues, and Human Cadavers. 
Official Journal of the Federation 20 Feb 1985. 
Errata Official Journal of the Federation 09 Jul 1985. 





Regulation of the General Health Law regarding Delivery of Medical Care Services. 
Official Journal of the Federation 14 May 1986. 
Alterations Official Journal of the Federation 04 Dec 2009 
 
Regulation of the General Health Law regarding Health Research. 
Official Journal of the Federation 06 Jan 1987. 
 
Regulation of the General Health Law regarding Public Health Control of Activities, 
Establishments, Products and Services. 
Official Journal of the Federation 18 Jan 1988. 
Alterations Official Journal of the Federation 28 Apr 2004 
 
Regulation on Health Supplies  
Official Journal of the Federation 04 Feb 1998. 
Corrections Official Journal of the Federation 05 Aug 2008. 
 
Regulation on Public Health Control of Products and Services. 
Official Journal of the Federation 09 Aug 1999. 
Alterations Official Journal of the Federation 6 Apr 2006 
 
Regulation on Registrations, Authorizations of  Importation and Exportation and  Export 
Certificates of Insecticides, Plant Nutrients and Substances and Toxic or Dangerous 
Materials. 
Official Journal of the Federation 28 Dec 2004. 
 
Regulation on Customs Law 
Official Journal of the Federation 06 Jun 1996 
Last Alteration Official Journal of the Federation 28 Oct 2003. 
 
Regulation on the Law of Biosecurity for Genetically Modified Organisms 
Official Journal of the Federation 19 Mar 2008 
Last Alteration Official Journal of the Federation 02 Jun 2009 
 
Regulation on the Federal Law for the Control of Chemical Precursors, Essential 
Chemical Products and Machinery for Producing Capsules, Tablets and Pills  
Official Journal of the Federation 15 Sep 1999 
 
Regulation on the Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Governmental 
Information 
Official Journal of the Federation 11 Jun 2004 
 
Internal Regulations of the Secretariat of Health 
Official Journal of the Federation 19 Jan 2004 







4. Plans and Programs 
 
National Development Plan 2007-2012. 
Official Journal of the Federation 31 May 2007. 
 
Health Sector Program 2007-2012 




Decree which establishes the basis of coordination for the Secretaries of Commerce and 
Industry, of Agriculture and Water Resources, of Urban Development and Ecology and 
of Health, that should be observed in regard to Insecticides, Fertilizers, and Toxic 
Substances. 
Official Journal of the Federation 15 Oct 1987. 
 
Decree by which is created the National Vaccination Council  
Official Journal of the Federation 24 Jan 1991. 
Corrections Official Journal of the Federation 05 Jul 2001. 
 
Decree by which is changed the National Council for AIDS Prevention and Control. 
Official Journal of the Federation 05 Jul 2001. 
 
Decree by which is created the National Bioethics Council. 
Official Journal of the Federation 07 Sep 2005. 
 
6. Executive Agreements 
 
Agreement by which is created the Inter-Institutional Commision on Health Research. 
Official Journal of the Federation 19 Oct 1983. 
 
Agreement by which is created the National Committee for Health Security 
Official Journal of the Federation 23 Sep 2003. 
 
Agreement by which is established the Integration and Objectives of the National Health 
Council. 
Official Journal of the Federation 27 Jan 2009. 
 
7. Secretarial Agreements  
 
Agreement Number 43. By which is created the Health Research Committee. 
Official Journal of the Federation 11 Jan 1985. 
 
Agreement by which instructions are made known for the uniform and comprehensive 
procedure to which is subjected the Secretaries of Commerce and Industry, of Agriculture 
and Water Resources, of Urban Development and Ecology, in the resolution of requests 
for authorizations for licenses, permissions, and registries of insecticides, fertilizers, and 
toxic substances.  
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Official Journal of the Federation 07 Dec 1988. 
 
Agreement Number 130. By which is created the National Committee for Epidemiologic 
Surveillance. 
Official Journal of the Federation 06 Sep 1995. 
 
Agreement that establishes the classification and coding of merchandise whose 
importation is subject to regulation by those agencies which make up the the Inter-
Secretarial Commision for the Control of the Process and Use of Inecticides, Fertilizers, 
and Toxic Substances. 
Official Journal of the Federation 29 Mar 2002. 
Last modifications Official Journal of the Federation 01 Apr 2005, 26 May 2008, 25 Aug 
2010. 
 
Agreement by which is established certification of the geographic areas that have 
achieved elimination of transmission of canine rabies.  
Official Journal of the Federation 16 Mar 2004. 
 
Agreement by which is established certification of the geographic areas which have 
achieved elimination of transmission of malaria.  
Official Journal of the Federation 16 Mar 2004. 
 
Agreement by which is created the National Committee of the Tuberculosis Action 
Program. 
Official Journal of the Federation 16 Mar 2004. 
 
Agreement by which is made known the instructions and forms for the authorization of 
importation and exportation of insecticides, plant nutrients and dangerous substances and 
materials. 
Official Journal of the Federation 15 Sep 2005. 
 
Agreement by which is made known the instructions and forms for the authorization of 
importation and exportation of insecticides, plant nutrients and dangerous substances and 
materials. 
Official Journal of the Federation 15 Sep 2005. 
 
Agreement through which all the institutions of the national health system in its public, 
social, and private levels of medical services, must immediately notify the Secretariat of 
Health of probable cases of influenza meeting the case definition established by the 
Secretariat of Health.  
Official Journal of the Federation 02 May 2009 
 
Agreement which establishes the classification and codification of merchandise and 
products whose importation, exportation, entrance or exit is subject to the sanitary 
regulation of the Secretariat of Health.  
Official Journal of the Federation 27 Sep 2007 




8. Decisions of the General Public Health Council  
 
Agreement by which is established that public institutions of the national health system 
should purchase interchangeable generic medications. 
Official Journal of the Federation 07 Jun 2002. 
 
Basic List and Catalog of Medications, Edition 2010. 
Official Journal of the Federation 13 May 2011. 
First Update Official Journal of the Federation 10 Jun 2011 
Second Update Official Journal of the Federation 20 Jul 2011 
Third Update Official Journal of the Federation 11 Aug 2011 
Fourth Update Official Journal of the Federation 24 Oct 2011  
 
Basic List and Catalog of Biological Products and Reagents of the Health Sector 1997. 
Official Journal of the Federation 29 Sep 1997. 
First update Official Journal of the Federation 16 Mar 1998. 
Second update Official Journal of the Federation 20 Jul 1998. 
Third update Official Journal of the Federation 06 May 1999. 
Fourth update Official Journal of the Federation 22 Dec 1999. 
Fifth update Official Journal of the Federation 03 Nov 2000. 
Sixth update Official Journal of the Federation 13 Mar 2002. 
Seventh update Official Journal of the Federation 12 Apr 2002. 
Eighth update Official Journal of the Federation 06 Aug 2002. 
 
Catalog of Interchangeable Generic Medications  
Official Journal of the Federation 17 Aug 1998. 
And its subsequent updates published in the Official Journal of the Federation 
 
Agreement by which is established the Prevention and Health Promotion Strategy during 
the Stages of Life. 
Official Journal of the Federation 23 Oct 2003. 
 
Basic List and Catalog of Diagnostic Materials, Edition 2010. 
Official Journal of the Federation 09 May 2011. 
First update Official Journal of the Federation 07 Sept 2011. 
 
Agreement by which is established the Commission for Definition of Treatments and 
Medications Associated with Diseases that Result in Catastrophic Costs. 
Official Journal of the Federation 28 Apr 2004. 
 
Agreement by which is established the obligatory application in the public and private 
institutions of the National Health System, of the substantive and strategic components 
and components of the Action Program Start Out Even in Life and of epidemiologic 
surveillance of maternal deaths. 
Official Journal of the Federation 01 Nov 2004. 
 
Agreement by which are established the general obligatory measures for the prevention, 
care and control of HIV/AIDS in the public institutions of the National Health System. 
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Official Journal of the Federation 12 Nov 2004. 
 
9. Official Mexican Norms 
 
Included here are all the Official Mexican Norms emitted to the present, but as per 
federal law, these are in effect for five years from the date of emission, in which time 
they need to be revised or will become inactive.  
 
A) National Advisory Committee on Standardization of Public Health Regulation 
and Promotion. SSA1. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-003-SSA2-1993, on the use of human blood and its 
components for therapeutic ends. 
Official Journal of the Federation 18 Jul 1994. 
Errata Official Journal of the Federation 23 Feb 1996. 
Clarification Official Journal of the Federation 08 Sep 1994. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-230-SSA1-2002, Environmental health. Water for human 
use and consumption, public health requirements that private and public supply systems 
of water should follow. Public health procedures for sampling.   
Official Journal of the Federation 12 Jul 2005. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-020-SSA1-1993,Environmental Health. Criteria for 
evaluating air quality  in regard to ozone (O2). The level of ozone concentration defined 
as a measure of protection of the population’s health.  
Official Journal of the Federation 23 Dec 1994. 
Project Modification Official Journal of the Federation 31 Jul 2000. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-022-SSA1-1993 Environmental Health. Environmental 
criteria for evaluating air quality in regard to sulfur dioxide (SO2). The level of sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) in ambiental air as a measure of protection of the population’s health.   
Official Journal of the Federation 23 Dec 1994. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-59-SSA1-1993, good production practices for chemical-
pharmaceutical establishments engaged in the production of medications. 
Official Journal of the Federation 31 Jul 1998. 
Clarification Official Journal of the Federation 01 Feb 1999. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-115-SSA1-1994, Goods and Services. Method for 
determining the presence of staphylococcus aureus in foods. 
Official Journal of the Federation 25 Sep 1995. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-199-SSA1-2000, Environmental Health. Levels of lead in 
blood and actions as criteria to protect the health of populations exposed occupationally. 
Official Journal of the Federation 18 Oct 2002. 
 




Official Journal of the Federation 15 Nov 2004. 
 
B) National Advisory Committee of Standards for Disease Prevention and Control. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-006-SSA2-1993 for the prevention and control of 
tuberculosis in primary health care. 
Official Journal of the Federation 26 Jan 1995. 
Modification Official Journal of the Federation 31 Oct 2000. 
Modification Project Official Journal of the Federation 02 Sep 2004. 
Modification Official Journal of the Federation 27 Sep 2005. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-010-SSA2-1993, for the prevention and control of HIV 
infection. 
Official Journal of the Federation 17 Jan 1995. 
Modification Project Official Journal of the Federation 22 Sep 1999. 
Modification of the Norm Official Journal of the Federation 21 Jun 2000. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-011-SSA2-1993, for the prevention and control of rabies. 
Official Journal of the Federation 25 Jan 1995. 
Modification Official Journal of the Federation 24 Jan 2001. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-016-SSA2-1994, for the surveillance, prevention, control 
and treatment of cholera. 
Official Journal of the Federation 05 Oct 2000. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-017-SSA2-1994, for epidemiologic surveillance. 
Official Journal of the Federation 11 Oct 1999. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-021-SSA2-1994, for the surveillance, prevention, and 
control of the tenia/cysticercosis complex in primary health care. 
Official Journal of the Federation 21 Aug 1996. 
Modification Project: Official Journal of the Federation 11 Sep 2000. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-021-SSA2-1994, for the prevention and control of the 
teniasis/cysticercosis in primary health care. 
Modification Official Journal of the Federation 21 May 2004. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-022-SSA2-1994, for the prevention and control of 
brucellosis in man in primary health care.   
Official Journal of the Federation 30 Nov 95. 
Modification Project: D.O.F: 27 Jun 2000. 
Modification Official Journal of the Federation 02 Feb 2001. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-026-SSA2-1998, for epidemiologic surveillance, 
prevention and control of nosocomial infections. 
Official Journal of the Federation 26 Jan 2001. 




Official Mexican Norm NOM-027-SSA2-2007, for the prevention, control and 
elimination of leprosy. 
Official Journal of the Federation 12 Aug 2009 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-029-SSA2-1999, for epidemiologic surveillance, 
prevention and control of leptospirosis in man. 
Official Journal of the Federation 02 Feb 2001. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-032-SSA2-2002, For the epidemiologic surveillance, 
prevention and control of vector-borne diseases.  
Official Journal of the Federation 21 Jul 2003. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-036-SSA2-2002, Prevention and control of diseases.  
Application of vaccines, toxoids, sera, antitoxins, and immunoglobulins in man. 
Official Journal of the Federation 17 Jul 2003. 
Clarification Official Journal of the Federation 20 Jan 2004. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-039-SSA2-2002, For the prevention and control of 
sexually transmitted infections. 
Official Journal of the Federation 19 Sep 2003. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-041-SSA2-2002, For the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, 
control and epidemiologic surveillance of breast cancer. 
Official Journal of the Federation 17 Sep 2003. 
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-042-SSA2-2006, For the prevention and control of 
diseases.  Public health specifications for canine veterinary services.   
 
Official Mexican Norm NOM-045-SSA2-2005, For epidemiologic surveillance, 
prevention and control of nosocomial infections. 
Official Journal of the Federation 20 Nov 2009. 
 
10. Other Juridical Orders  
 
Criteria for the certification of geographic areas that have achieved elimination of canine 
rabies transmission. 
Official Journal of the Federation 19 Aug 2005. 
 
Criteria for the certification of geographic areas that have achieved the elimination of 
malaria transmission. 
Official Journal of the Federation 10 Apr 2006. 
 
General rules regarding exterior commerce for 2011. 






11. International Decisions  
 
Decree by which is approved Prohibition of the Development, Production and Storage of 
Bacterial Weapons (Biologic) and Toxins and on their Destruction; approved during the 
XVI normal session during the United Nations General Assembly. 
Official Journal of the Federation 04 Apr 1973. 
 
Enactment Decree of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Storage and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 
Official Journal of the Federation 05 Oct 1994. 
 
Decree by which is approved the Cartagena Protocol on the Security of Biotechnology of 
the Convention on Biologic Diversity, adopted in Montreal, on January 21, 2000. 
Official Journal of the Federation 01 Jul 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
